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I. INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago the Printer's Row area just south of the Loop in Chicago was
dominated by a mix of industrial and commercial properties including, as its name
implies, a large number of printing companies.' While the area was thriving, it is
I Copyright 2001 by Alex Geisinger.
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. The author wishes
to thank John Applegate, Richard Revesz, David Myers, Bruce Berner, and Robert Blomquist
for their helpful comments and thoughtful review of earlier drafts. Amy McDonnel and Shawna
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1. Printing House Row, as it is formally known, is located in the center of a large
commercial and industrial region just south of the Chicago Loop that developed shortly after
the Great Fire of 1871. CITY OF CICAGO, PRINTING HOUSE Row DISTRICT: PRELIMINARY
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 1 (rev. ed. 1983). As the land uses of the region became
differentiated, the State Street areajust east of Printer's Row developed into a commercial retail
district with the establishment there of such stores as Marshall Field's, while the LaSalle Street
area to the west emerged as the city's financial center. Id. The area bordering Printer's Row to
the south became dominated by railroad yards and the newly constructed Dearborn Station
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likely that some of its inhabitants were also polluting. Although there were no laws
like Superfimd2 back then, the inks and thinners used by printers would be considered
hazardous and their release into the environment would be subject to cleanup today.
Since that time Printer's Row has gone through an unanticipated change. First, shortly
after World War II the printing companies began to leave the city3 and by the 1960s
the area became almost completely derelict." Recently, however, a new wave of
residents has come to the area and it has been reborn.' The various printing houses
have been turned into residential lofts, and accompanying commercial uses-such as
the cafd I am writing this Article in at the moment-have joined the loft operations
to create a thriving community. In short, the ability to change the industrial buildings
to residences has revitalized the area.
There are, of course, numerous areas in cities around the country that have
experienced similar changes. One wonders what Printer's Row would look like today
if fifty years ago-a time when no one would have likely thought that Printer's Row
would be anything but printing houses-printing companies were allowed to clean
the hazardous substances they had released by removing some of the toxins and then
pledging not to change the use of their property to anything but industrial use. This
concern is a reality today as environmental regulators begin considering a new
cleanup program that will have such an effect.
The new use-restricted cleanup paradigm is the latest of the cost-saving devices that
have come to dominate the skyline of environmental regulation. While traditional
cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 19806 ("CERCLA") generally protected health and the environment
by requiring full detoxification or removal of contaminants at a site,7 use-restricted
Railroad Terminal. Id.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3. CTY OF CHICAGO, supra note 1, at 8. The reasons for this departure were varied:
After World War II, photo offset began to replace the traditional letterpress
printing method. The new heavier presses created a substantial strain on the
floorload of the older buildings, causing many printers to move to one-story
concrete structures. Additionally, the narrow streets ofthe district could no longer
handle the volume of truck traffic needed to supply paper to the speedily
productive offset presses. These changes in technology as well as a more
advantageous tax situation prompted many companies to relocate to the suburbs.
Parallel to this trend was the decline of the railroad as the nation's primary
transportation system. With the boom of the airline industry, the Dearborn Street
Station gradually ceased to be a major transportation facility.
Id. at 8-9.
4. Id. at 9.
5. One of the main influences on this revitalization was the transformation of the railroad
yards on the south end of Printer's Row. Dearborn Park Construction Starts: First Families
to Move In Next Fall, DEARBORN PARKNEwS (Dearborn Park Corp., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 1977,
at 1, 8. This area had, like Printer's Row, fallen into disrepair by the early 1970s. Cf id. at 1.
In 1977, however, ground was broken for the development of Dearborn Park, a planned 3000
unit development intended to provide affordable housing to middle-class minorities. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
7. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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cleanup pairs reduced removal or detoxification of materials at a contaminated site
with a limitation of use ensuring that the site will notbe used in ways that will expose
people to the remaining contaminants.' By ensuring that property will be used
only for the types of uses that carry with them limited exposures to
contaminants--primarily industrial and commercial-more contamination canbe left
in the ground while the same level of health protection can be maintained. The use-
restricted cleanup program thus aims to protect the same amount of health for less
cost.
The new cleanup paradigm restricts property use through two different means.
First, the program predicts the future use to which property will be put.' Second, it
requires that the property use be legally restricted to ensure that it does not change to
an unanticipated use in the future.10 Cleanup, in turn, is done only to the level
required by the anticipated future use.
This Article provides both a specific critique of existing programs and a general
analysis of the policy concerns and tools necessary to implement a proper use-
restricted cleanup program. First, it argues that there are no means available for either
predicting or legally restricting the use of property as required by existing use-
restricted cleanup programs. As a result, the use of partially cleaned property may
change in an unanticipated way, resulting in greater exposure to contaminants and
greater harm to human health than is currently allowed by law. While existing use-
restricted programs fail to protect human health and the environment, the cost savings
associated with restricted cleanups are substantial.
This Article thus also considers ways to implement properly a cleanup regime that
considers future land use. It concludes that while there is no way to create a "pure!'
use-restricted cleanup program, regulators can protect health and the environment at
substantial cost savings by internalizing potential future costs into current cleanup
expenditures and focusing on cleaning property in the future instead of restricting its
use. A number of examples of how this can be accomplished are considered.
The Article is organized in the following way. First it considers the traditional
cleanup paradigm and the criticisms of its cost-effectiveness. It then introduces the
concept of use-restricted cleanup, describing the way in which it responds to these
criticisms.
Next, it turns to the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") use-restricted
program as an example of the new use-restricted cleanup regimes; analyzing the
requirements that property use be predicted and proscribed in a manner that ensures
use will not change in the future and, ultimately, examining the way in which current
land-use prediction techniques and law fail to satisfy these needs. Finally, the Article
turns its attention to alternative means for accomplishing use-restricted cleanup while
satisfying the policy concerns implicated by the inability to predict and restrict
property use.
8. Different uses ofproperty carry with them different routes ofexposure to contaminants.
With residential use, for example, we can assume that children may live at the property and eat
or disturb contaminated soil while playing in it. Regulators would not assume a similar
exposure for property being used for industrial purposes.
9. See infra Part ll.B.
10. See infra Part I.B.
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II. THE CHANGING TREND IN SITE REMEDIATION
A. The Existing Cleanup Program: Full Cleanup
at Substantial Cost
Under CERCLA" and state Superfund statutes" remediation of toxic wastes has
traditionally been accomplished by removing them from the environment, destroying
or reducing their toxicity, or sealing them in place. The preference for this treatment
method arose from a general concern that environmental laws not create a vicious
cycle of inadequate disposal leading to new contaminated sites. 3 Such a cleanup
further satisfied the requirement that once cleaned, land should be available for any
type of post-remediation use whether that be industrial, residential, agricultural, or
even recreational.'
This traditional cleanup paradigm has come under increased attack in recent years.
In particular, critics of the existing paradigm argue that in a world of limited
resources the money spent on such complete cleanups is wasteful and frequently
unnecessary. 5 Justice Stephen Breyer captures much of this criticism with an
example in his frequently cited book on risk-based regulation, Breaking the Vicious
Circle:
The first [example] comes from a case in my own court, United States v. Ottati
& Goss, arising out of a ten-year effort to force cleanup of a toxic waste dump in
southern New Hampshire. The site was mostly cleaned up. All but one of the
private parties had settled. The remaining private party litigated the cost of
cleaning up the last little bit, a cost of about $9.3 million to reinove a small
amount of highly diluted PCBs and "volatile organic compounds" ... by
incinerating the dirt.... [W]ithout the extra expenditure, the waste dump was
clean enough for children playing on the site to eat small amounts of dirt daily for
70 days each year without significant harm. Burning the soil would have made
it clean enough for the children to eat small amounts daily for 245 days per year
without significant harm. But there were no dirt-eating children playing in the
area, for it was a swamp. Nor were dirt-eating children likely to appear there, for
future building seemed unlikely. 6
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1994) (giving preference to remedial actions "in which
treatment which permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity of mobility of the
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants is a principle element").
12. See generally Linda K. Breggin et al., State Superfund Programs: An Overview of the
Environmental Law Institute's (ELI's) 1998Research, ALB. L. ENvTL OUTLOOK, Winter 1999,
at 1.
13. John S. Applegate & Stephen Dycus, Institutional Controls or Emperor's Clothes?
Long-Form Stewardship ofthe Nuclear Weapons Complex, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,631, at 10,639 n.88 (Nov. 1998).
14. See id. at 10,639.
15. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE 11-19 (1993); Richard L.
Revesz& Richard B. Stewart, The SuperfundDebate, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS,
SCIENCE, AND LAw 3, 14-16 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995); Gerald W.
Phillips, Rethinking Restoration: Risk Based Corrective Action and the Future of Economic
Regulation, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 659, 660-63 (1996).
16. See BREYER, supra note 15, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
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As Breyer's single example makes abundantly clear, traditional cleanup programs,
particularly with their emphasis on making property clean enough to be used for any
purpose, can result in exorbitant expenditures of resources for the protection of little,
if any, further public health. 7
B. The New Program: Protecting Health
at Substantial Cost Savings
In the wake of the criticisms of the first generation of cleanup programs, a new
remediation paradigm has arisen. According to this new vision, remediation goals are
achieved by limiting exposure to hazardous substances instead of by removing them
or decreasing their toxicity.'8 By limiting exposure one can maintain the same amount
of protection of human health and the environment without undertaking costly
removal efforts.' 9
The devices used to limit exposure to hazardous substances left in the ground are
called institutional controls. ° Institutional controls are restrictions on the use of
land.2' They are put in place to "ensure that the actual use to which such a site is put
after cleanup is compatible with the level of cleanup completed."' Institutional
controls can be very narrow and restrictive, such as prohibiting entry to an area with
a fence, or restricting the use of contaminated groundwater. They can also be broad,
such as restricting particular activities or classes of activities on or near a site.2 As
a general matter, institutional controls now play an important role in the remediation
process. According to the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), EPA "expects to use
institutional controls such as water use and deed restrictions to supplement
engineering controls as appropriate for short- and long-term management to prevent
or limit exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants."24 Indeed, at
EPA, institutional controls are now considered an integral component of a complete
remedy.' While they are usually combined with active protections that actually
17. Katherine D. Walker et al., Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk
Assessment and Management, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW,
supra note 15, at 25, 39-40.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1994).
19. See David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls at Superfund Sites, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,279 (May 1993); see also Applegate & Dycus, supra note 13, at 10,639-41.
20. Although not explicitly allowing for the use of institutional controls, CERCLA
recognizes that remedial actions may "result[ in... hazardous substances... remaining at the
site." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c).
21. Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,279.
22. John Pendergrass, Use of Institutional Controls as Part of a Superfund Remedy:
Lessons from Other Programs, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,109, at 10,110 (Mar.
1996).
23. Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,279.
24. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D) (2000).
25. The regulatory language states: "In appropriate site situations, treatment ofthe principal
threats posed by a site, with priority placed on treating waste that is liquid, highly toxic or
highly mobile, will be combined with engineering controls (such as containment) and
institutional controls, as appropriate, for treatment of residuals and untreated waste." Id. §
300.430(a)(1)(iii)(C).
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remove contaminants or reduce their toxicity, institutional controls can now be the
sole component of a complete cleanup where active measures are determined to be
impracticable.26 One recent review of CERCLA records of decision has shown that
institutional controls were used in thirty-three of the forty-two states reviewed.'
One specific means of limiting exposure ties the required level of cleanup of a
property to the property's expected future use. Different uses of property result in
different potential routes and durations of exposure to hazardous substances. For
example, with residential use, children may play in the soil over a substantial portion
of their childhood and be exposed to contaminants in the soil through dermal contact,
inhalation of contaminants when soil is disturbed, or by ingesting soil. Similarly,
agricultural use may result in significant exposure through both dermal contact and
inhalation as contaminants are released when the soil is disturbed. Industrial use, on
the other hand, is not likely to give rise to the same number of exposure routes
because frequently any contamination will be covered over by concrete floors or
asphalt driveways and most work is usually done inside a building." Finally,
recreational users may be exposed to contaminants through a number of routes, but
their exposure will be limited to the times that they are in the recreational area.'
Limiting property's use may significantly limit the exposure to contamination that
results.3" For example, while residential property is likely to have a significant
number of exposure pathways of long-term duration, industrial property may not By
ensuring that contaminated property could not be used for residential purposes in the
future, a potentially responsible party ("PRP") would be able to leave more
contamination in the ground without causing greater risk to human health or the
environment simply because that same amount of contamination will not be exposed
to man or nature in any meaningful amount."
Substantial support for this type of land-use-restricted cleanup can be found in a
26. The NCP states:
[The use of institutional controls shall not substitute for active response measures
(e.g. treatment and/or containment of source material, restoration ofgroundwaters
to their beneficial uses) as the sole remedy unless such active measures are
determined not to be practicable, based on the balancing of trade-offs among
alternatives that is conducted during the selection of a remedy.
Id. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D).
27. Applegate & Dycus, supra note 13, at 10,461 n.1 10.
28. For a general analysis ofexposure pathways, see James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi,
Human Health Risk Assessments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 585-889 (1994).
29. E.g., OFFiCEOFENvTL MGMT., U.S. DEP'TOFENERGY, DOE/EM-0283,CHARTNGTHE
COURSE: THE FUTURE USE REPORT 13 fig.6 (1996) (describing seven land-use categories and
their exposure pathways).
30. For a general analysis ofthe rationale behind linking land use and cleanup, see ROBERT
HERSH ET AL, LINKING LAND USE AND SUPERFuND CLEANUP: UNCHARTERED TERRITORY
(1996).
31. Professor John Applegate has noted that "[i]n practice, the great divide in exposure
values (and hence risk) falls between commercial or industrial exposures and residential or
agricultural ones, mostly as a result of differences in duration and intensity of contact with soil
and ground water." John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental
Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES &ENVTL L. 243,271-72
(1998).
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study of risk assessments 2 of seventy-eight different CERCLA sites undertaken by
Professors James T. Hamilton and Kip Viscusi.33 The study analyzed the risks to
human health and the environment created by contaminated sites. One principle
guiding the risk assessments undertaken at these sites strongly encouraged the
assessors to consider the risk that would arise if the property were to be used in the
future for residential purposes.' The study found that the vast majority of risks
created by the hazardous sites were not to existing users of the property. Rather, the
greatest risks fell on potential future users of the property if the use was changed to
residential. The authors conclude:
Consideration of the risk assessments for Superfund sites indictes... that it is
not the existing risks that are most salient. Rather, the dominant risks arise from
future risk scenarios that generally involve alternative uses of the land. Indeed,
these future risks account for 90% of all the risk-weighted pathways for the
Superfund sites in our sample. Chief among these future risks is that of future
residents livingon-site. The underlying assumption drivingthe EPAriskanalyses
is that there will be newresidential areas on existing future Superfund sites where
there are currently no such residential areas. 5
32.
[The NCP] require[s] that a site-specific baseline risk assessment be conducted
to "characterize the current and potential threats to human health and the
environment that may be posed by contaminants migrating to ground water or
surface water, releasing to air, leaching through soil, remaining in the soil, and
bioaccumulating in the food chain."
The baseline risk assessment begins with the collection of site data, including
samples taken to determine chemical concentrations at the site and to identify the
potential chemicals of concern. Next an exposure assessment is conducted, where
the risk assessor analyzes the contaminant data from the site, identifies exposed
populations, determines potential exposure pathways, and estimates exposure
concentrations and intakes by pathway. During the toxicity assessment, the next
step, the analyst collects qualitative and quantitative information on the toxicity
of the chemicals at the cite, often using information from EPA's Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS). Finally, the information on exposure and toxicity is
combined in risk characterization models to estimate cancer risks and noncancer
hazard quotients for the chemicals and exposure pathways at the sites.
James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude andPolicy Implications ofHealth Risks
from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: EcoNoMIcs, SCIENCE, AND LAW,
supra note 15, at 55,58-59 (emphasis in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d)(4) (2000)).
33. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 32, at 57.
34. EPA has stated that
[b]ecause residential land use is most often associated with thegreatest exposures,
it is generally the most conservative choice to make when deciding what type of
alternative land use may occur in the future. Assume future residential land use
if it seems possible based on the evaluation of the available information.
I OFFICE OFEMERGENCYANDREMEDIALRESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/540/1-
89/002, RISKASSESSMENTGUIDANCEFORSUPERFUND: HUMANHEALTHEVALUATIONMANUAL
(PART A) 6-7 (1989).
35. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 32, at 78.
2001]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
It, of course, follows from this analysis-and Professors Hamilton and Viscusi
argue-that the majority of risks associated with a site could be eliminated simply by
restricting the use of the site to nonresidential purposes. 6 That is, without spending
anymoneyto remove contaminants or decrease their toxicity, literallyninetypercent
of all potential health and environmental impacts could be avoided simply by
ensuring that property could not be used as a residence in the future.37 Restricting use
in conjunction with remediation of contamination that threatens health and nature
based on the way property is currently used could thus result in the same amount of
health and environmental protection as removal and detoxification but at much less
cost. Indeed, one author has reported that adoption of a commercial instead of
residential use in one study showed a tenfold difference in the amount of
contaminants that did not need to be removed and could instead be left in the soil.3"
Land-use considerations were first used by states in promoting the development of
brownfields.39 "[B]rownfield[s] [are] best defined as 'abandoned or underutilized
urban land and/or infrastructure where expansion or redevelopment is complicated,
in part, because of known or potential environmental contamination."'" One of the
36. Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 28, at 609.
37. In the use-restricted cleanup context, the institutional control that will be used to limit
exposure is the land-use restriction. Restricting land use may be accomplished through a
number of different means such as restrictive zoning, easements, and restrictive covenants. For
a detailed analysis of the legal tools used to restrict land use and their viability, see infra Part
III.B.
38. Applegate & Dycus, supra note 13, at 10,639 n.96. Similar results were found in a
comparison of cleanup under the Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of 1976 ("RCRA'),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), when risk-based corrective action
("RBCA") was considered:
SITE ORIGINAL REMEDIAL REMEDIAL COST
COST ESTIMATE AFTERRBCA
Pesticide Formulator $40,000,000 $0
Solvent Recovery $2,000,000 $0
Wood Treatment $1,000,000 $0
Fuel Oil Storage $600,000 $100,000
Refinery $2,000,000 $500,000
Michael L. Gargas & Thomas F. Long, The Role of Risk Assessment in Redeveloping
Brownfields Sites, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 214, 227 tbl.2 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997),
reprinted in Applegate, supra note 31, at 274.
39. Applegate, supra note 31, at 271 (stating that Brownfields cleanups have placed
increased reliance on land-use considerations).
40. Joel B. Eisen, "BrownfieldsofDreams "?: Challenges andLimits of Voluntary Cleanup
Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL L. REV. 883, 890 (1996) (quoting OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE OF THE STATES ON
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major obstacles to the development of brownfields is the high cost of cleanup
associated with them. This cost frequently makes the development of a brownfield
economically unfeasible as it increases the costs significantly above the costs of
development of uncontaminated property. States have responded to the high cost of
cleanup with a number of initiatives including low-interest loans, tax credits, tax
incentives, and brownfields grants.4 The federal government too has responded to
this concern with the Brownfields tax incentives component of the Taxpayer Relief
Act.4" This program offers significant tax savings and other incentives to make
brownfields redevelopment more attractive.43
Recently, a number of states have turned to land use considerations as a means of
furtherreducingthe costs ofredevelopingbrownfields.' Similarly, EPA, recognizing
the value of such programs to decrease obstacles to such cleanup, has recommended
considering actual land use in its own brownfields action agenda.4 The perceived
success of employing land use considerations in brownfields remediation has led to
their rapid adoption for use in situations where liable parties, responsible for all costs
of cleanup, do exist.'
EPA, Congress, and a growing number of states, have quickly adopted the new
cleanup paradigm as an effective cost-saving measure to be employed in all
BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 1 (1995)).
41. See generally Linda K. Breggin & John Pendergrass, Voluntary & Brownfields
Remediation Programs: An Overview ofthe EnvironmentalLaw Institute's 1998 Research, 29
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,339 (June 1999), WL 29 ELR 10339 (describing the variety
of tools used by states to respond to the Brownfields problem).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 198 (Supp. IV 1998).
43. Tara Bums Koch, Comment, Betting on Brownfields-Does Florida's Brownfields
Redevelopment Act Transform Liability into Opportunity?, 28 STETSON L. REV. 171, 188-89
(1998).
44. See Breggin & Pendergrass, supra note 41, at *11; see also David L. Rieser, A
Practical Approach to Brownfields: An Overview of TACO and the SRP, 86 ILL B.J. 262
(1998) (discussing the Illinois rule that allows consideration of actual land use in remediating
brownfields).
45. Koch, supra note 43, at 188 (noting that the EPA action agenda includes considering
actual future land use in determining the remediation level required for that site).
46. It is not the intent ofthis Article to directly consider the policy implications offactoring
land use into cleanup standards for brownfields redevelopment. While many of the arguments
made herein are relevant to brownfields programs-particularly concerns regarding the ability
of regulators to respond to future problems when land use changes in an unanticipated
manner-the general equities of brownfields policy are distinct from those of cleanup when
PRPs are identified. By their nature, brownfields are abandoned properties where development
is unlikely due to the inability to find liable parties to clean the property. See Eisen, supra note
40, at 898 (noting that the problem is that nonliable parties do not want to assume the liability
that comes with cleaning and owning property). The key to brownfields redevelopment is thus
to create incentives for nonliable parties to clean a dirty property rather than develop a clean
one. Without overcoming this initial obstacle, property will remain unused in any productive
manner. This is not the case with cleanups where PRPs have been identified. There the
question is not whether a cleanup will be done but "how clean is clean." In these cases
concerns about internalizing the costs of cleanup into the costs of the activities creating
contamination, as well as issues of equity, dominate.
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environmental cleanups. Recent congressional attempts to reform CERCLA would
require consideration of land use in remedy selection.47 Even absent an express
congressional mandate, EPA has already implemented land-use-restricted cleanup
under CERCLA. A directive to regional offices from EPA's Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response ("OSWER") directs that future use of land be given
important consideration in determining the appropriate extent of remediation.48 The
OSWER directive explicitly recognizes the recent criticism of CERCLA cleanup
costs, noting that EPA has been criticized for too often assuming that future use will
be residential, a use that carries with it the greatest potential for exposure.49 The
directive thus strongly supports factoring future use into the choice of remedy. By
incorporating future land use into CERCLA remedy selection, the directive aims to
ensure that the most "practicable and cost-effective remedial alternatives" are
developed and considered in the cleanup process.50 Similarly, a number of states have
adopted or are considering employing land-use restrictions in cleanups pursuant to
their own state Superfund laws.5'
The idea of how hazardous wastes are remediated is thus currently going through
a drastic change. Rather than emphasizing removal or decontamination, regulators
now consider whether exposure can be limited. In many cases limiting exposure will
be accomplished simply by restricting the use of property. By ensuring that property
is not used in a manner that will increase exposure, the amount of contamination that
needs to be removed to protect human health and the environment will be minimized
with substantial cost savings to PRPs.
H. FAILURE OF THE CURRENT LAND-USE-RESTRICTED PROGRAM
A. The Current Process for Restricting Land Use
The key to the success of land-use-restricted environmental cleanups is to allow
them to be done only in situations where the use of the contaminated property will not
47. H.R. 1300, 106th Cong. § 401 (a)(2)(A) (1999) ("For purposes of selecting the method
or methods of remediation appropriate for a given facility, the President shall identify the
current and reasonably anticipated uses of land, water, and other resources at and around the
facility and the timing of such uses.").
48. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
OSWER DIRECTIvE No. 9355.7-04, LAND USE IN CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS 2
(1995), 1995 WL 457568 [hereinafter OSWER DIRECTIVE], summarized in 60 Fed. Reg.
29,595 (June 5, 1995). The process set out by the OSWER directive is considered infra at Part
III.A.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id. at *2.
51. Breggin et al., supra note 12, at 3, 6 (noting that a number of states have adopted a
tiered approach to establish cleanup standards); Kenneth J. Pokalsky, Reforming New York
State'sSuperfund, ALB. L. ENVTL OUTLOK, Winter 1999, at 32,33 (proposing legislation that
would allow cleanup requirements to be based on site-specific risk factors, which include the
intended use of the property after remediation); James P. O'Brien, The Tiered Approach to
Corrective Action Objectives and the Site Remediation Program in Illinois, 27 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,611 (Dec. 1997).
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change to an unanticipated use with greater exposures. If such a change did occur to
atypeof use with greater exposures than those anticipated, the cleanup would not be
protective of human health.52 Generally, use-restricted cleanup programs attempt to
accomplish this task by both predicting the future use of a property and proscribing
all other uses of it.53 The EPA regime will serve as an example. The first element of
the regime requires EPA to predict how a property may be used in the future.' I will
refer to this as the predictive element of the regime. By identifying future uses, the
predictive element allows regulators to determine the associated exposures to which
the cleanup must respond.55 The future use determination thus becomes the key to
selection of the appropriate remedy for the site. It will be used to determine the
amount and type of cleanup to be done, if any.
The future-use component plays another role in the use-restricted cleanup regime.
Not only does it determine the uses that a property will be put to, but it also plays a
part in ensuring that property use will not change in the future.' Simply put, if one
knows that property will be used only for industrial purposes in the future, then one
need not worry that the use will change to a type that will result in greater exposure
to contaminants. If one has analyzed future use correctly, then market forces alone
will continue to ensure that the property use does not change. Thus the predictive
element of the regime both identifies the anticipated uses of property and helps to
ensure that once the property is "clean," its use will not change.
Currently, EPA is directed to predict future use based on a variety of factors,
including the land's current uses, local zoning laws, accessibility of transportation
and public utilities, historical development patterns, cultural factors, the location of
dangerous or environmentally sensitive geographical features, and environmental-
justice concerns.' EPA is directed, however, not to let the determination of future use
52. Contra 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1994) ("[R]emedial actions... shall attain a degree
of cleanup... which assures protection of human health and the environment.').
53. For a general analysis, see Applegate, supra note 31, at 280-82 (establishing the
prediction-control distinction and arguing that both prediction and control of future use can be
flawed).
54. OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 48, at *3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *5-6.
57. Id. at *4-5. The directive states that sources and types of information that may aid EPA
in determining the reasonably anticipated future land use include, but are not limited to current
land use; zoning laws; zoning maps; comprehensive community master plans; population
growth patterns and projections (e.g., Bureau of Census projections); accessibility of site to
existing infrastructure (e.g., transportation and public utilities); institutional controls currently
in place; site location in relation to urban, residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and
recreational areas; federal/state land-use designation (federal/state control over designated
lands range from established uses for the general public, such as national parks or state
recreational areas, to governmental facilities providing extensive site access restrictions, such
as Department ofDefense facilities); historical or recent development patterns; cultural factors
(e.g., historical sites and Native American religious sites); natural resources information;
potential vulnerability of ground water to contaminants that might migrate from soil;
environmental justice issues; location of on-site or nearby wetlands; proximity of site to a
floodplain; proximity ofsiteto critical habitats of endangered or threatened species; geographic
and geologic information and location ofwellhead-protection areas, recharge areas, and other
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"become an extensive, independent research project.""8 Instead, it is directed to rely
on existing information as much as possible along with input from local planning
authorities and the public.5 9 Regulators will use this information to develop a future
land-use determination. If they are "highly uncertain" of future use, then regulators
are directed to develop a range of reasonably likely future land uses.60 However, in
most situations the directive anticipates that regulators can reach a specific conclusion
about future use with certainty.61 Indeed, if a site is currently used for a particular
purpose, is in an area zoned for that use, and the comprehensive plan predicts the site
will continue to be used for that purpose, the directive states that regulators can be
certain that the land will be used for that purpose alone in the future.62 Similarly,
when the public and land-use agencies are in agreement over future use, EPA is
directed that such agreement will ensure the certainty of the future land-use
determination.63
The predictive element is to be used in conjunction with a second element of the
current regime that requires the use of institutional controls to "prevent an
unanticipated change in land use that could result in unacceptable exposures to
residual contamination." I will referto this as the proscriptive element of the regime.
Once the future use of a site is determined, cleanup levels of the site will be keyed to
the determined future use of the property.65 Although predicting future use alone
should ensure that property use does not change in the future, regulators will still
have to use institutional controls to ensure that future use does not, in fact, change.
The OSWER directive envisions the use of a variety of institutional controls to
accomplish this task. It identifies the types of institutional controls that may be used
and the requirements for their success:
[I]nstitutional controls will play a key role in ensuring long-term protectiveness
and should be evaluated and implemented with the same degree of care as is
given to other elements of the remedy. In developing remedial alternatives that
include institutional controls, EPA should determine: the type of institutional
control to be used, the existence of the authority to implement the institutional
control, and the appropriate entity's resolve and ability to implement the
institutional control. An alternative may anticipate two or more options for
establishing institutional controls, but should fully evaluate all such options. A
variety of institutional controls may be used such as deed restrictions and deed
notices, and adoption of land use controls by a local government. These controls
either prohibit certain kinds of site uses or, at a minimum, notifypotential owners
areas identified in a state's comprehensive ground-water protection program. Id. at *4-5.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *5-6.
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. at *5.
63. Id. ("Where there is substantial agreement among local residents and land use planning
agencies, owners, and developers, EPA can rely with a great deal of certainty on the future land
use already anticipated for the site.").
64. Id. at *7.
65. The directive recognizes that in some situations, cleanup to a particular land-use level
may not be cost effective or practicable, and thus allows for cleanup to be done to lesser levels
than those required for future use in those situations. Id. at *6.
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or land users of the presence of hazardous substances remaining on site at levels
that are not protective for all uses. Where exposure must be limited to assure
protectiveness, a deed notice alone generally will not provide a sufficiently
protective remedy. While the ROD need not always specify the precise type of
control to be imposed, sufficient analysis should be shown in the FS and ROD
to support a conclusion that effective implementation of institutional controls can
reasonably be expected."
Thus, the EPA program is built on two elements intended to ensure that property
will not be used in unanticipated ways: first, by predicting the future use of
properties, and second, by ensuring that, even if a change in use is desired by the
property owner in the future, it cannot be achieved after the cleanup. This, in turn,
will assure that humans will not be exposed to residual contamination at levels that
impact health.
B. The Current Process Cannot Predict or Proscribe Land Use
As with all use-restricted cleanup programs, the current EPA use-restricted cleanup
program's success hinges on the ability to restrict property to particular uses through
a combination of predictive and proscriptive means. This section of the Article,
however, argues that future property use cannotbepredicted, nor can itbeproscribed.
As a result, current use-restricted cleanup regimes fail to protect public health. The
inability to predict or proscribe future property use also carries significant policy
implications for use restricted cleanup in general. These concerns are considered in
the following section's argument for a revised use-restricted cleanup scheme.
1. Long-Term Future Use Cannot Be Predicted
While agency guidance seems to treat the issue passingly, 7 it is simply impossible
to predict accurately the future use of property. For example, the process for
determining future use of land set forth in the OSWER directive considers factors
similar to those used by land-use planners in creating land-use plans."' Analysis of
land-use planning techniques will thus provide useful insights into the limitations on
the ability of even the most thorough planning process to predict future use.
A large and varied group of factors affect the use of property. The main factors that
influence future property use are employment andpopulation. "[P]lanners believe that
changes in local and regional employment drive population changes, that population
changes drive changes in the demand for housing, and that changes in employment
and housing drive changes in many types of local land uses."69 Thus, the number of
people and jobs in the area are the most important factors in determining how land
66. Id. at *8.
67. See supra text accompanying note 58 (noting that the future use determination should
not become an "extensive independent research project").
68. "Comprehensive plans, sometimes known as 'general' or 'master' plans... plan for
the physical development of the community. They are future-oriented and project the
development of a community to a future point in time or a future point in the community's
growth." DANIELR. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw 77-78 (4th ed. 1997).
69. LARZT. ANDERSON, GUIDELINES FORPREPARING URBAN PLANS 101 (1995).
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is used. Other factors, such as the property's proximity to transportation as well as the
location and types of available utilities and community services will also significantly
impact property use. For example, planners will consider the quality of educational
facilities, existence of recreational and cultural outlets, number of religious
institutions, proximity of-hospitals, and level of public safety in determining whether
propertymaybe used forresidential purposes."0 In additionto community institutions
and services, the potential use of land can be affected by the regulatory policy of the
local government. For example, a policy of restricted growth will put more pressure
on existing structures to adapt to the needs of the community." ' On the other hand,
some municipalities may create tax abatements for certain uses of property, thus
creating an incentive for their creation.' Finally, the character of the land will also
affect how it is used. Considerations such as the land's basic geology, drainage
features, and topography are all relevant to the land's ability to be used for different
functions. 3 For example, property may not have the drainage or geology to support
the construction of large commercial buildings.
Determining future use requires planners to gather information onplanned changes
in employment and population, as well as all other relevant factors, such as planned
institutional development or changes to infrastructure and to determine how these
changes will influence land use in the future. Predicting future population and
employment trends is accomplished through gathering a wide variety of data and
applying this data to a predictive model.74 The types of data used in forecasting
population, for example, include the following:
records of historical population growth in the study area; zoning and density
constraints; records of historical population growth in similar geographical areas
or in larger ones of which the study area is a part; crude birth and death rates;
age-sex population breakdowns; fertility rates; and symptomatic data... such
as ... tax returns, voter registration, school enrollment, telephone installations,
utility meter connections, [and] occupancy permits issued .... '
This information is then applied to one of a number of potential future population
models in order to determine future population trends.76 Once future trends in
70. Id. at 69-70.
71. Such a policy may include a limitation on building permits given per year.
72. For example, a municipality may give tax abatements to commercial uses for a period
of time in hopes of bringing employment opportunities and a larger future tax base to the
community.
73. ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 58-59.
74. See generally MICHAEL R. GREENBERG ET AL, LOCAL POPULATION & EMPLOYMENT
PROJECTION TECHNIQUES (1988).
75. Id. at 7-8.
76. Population change involves three separate components: births, deaths, and migration.
Models can consider these directly or focus on other indicators:
Models that consider the separate effects of each of these components are known
as component models. Component models require comprehensive and detailed
data sets which are usually not available at the local government scale. Models
that directly use the net effects of the three components are noncomponent
models. Because ofdatalimitations, most models that project population at scales
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population and employment are forecast, planners must then consider how these
factors will both affect, and be affected by, potential changes in all other relevant
factors and ultimately determine how these changes will influence housing needs in
the particular area.
On its face this process, although cumbersome, seems a viable means for the
prediction of future property use. However, in the context of use-restricted cleanup,
there are a number of reasons why the process fails to adequately accomplish this
task. The most basic problem is, of course, the fact that the data necessary to predict
future population and employment is not usually available or is inadequate. For
example, planners recognize that "[t]he quality of employment data varies greatly."
Factors that will influence the quality of data include legal mandates that may restrict
information provided by employers and the fact that most small employers, the major
source of employment in most regions, are not required to report statistics to the
various agencies that gather this data.78
Similarly, "[t]he quality and availability of basic population information are quite
variable."'79 This is particularly the case when attempting to project population for
small geographical areas, which requires the use of data compiled at the municipal
level.
Symptomatic data, which are utilized at county and local levels, are usually
maintained by various public agencies for their own purposes. As such, the data
are much more subject to bias, gaps, inaccuracies, or sudden changes in recording
procedures that make their use for another purpose-population estimates and
below the state scale are noncomponent models.
Noncomponent models maybe based on past patterns ofnet population growth
or they may relate net population growth to indicator information, such as
changes in housing or voter registration. Noncomponent methods lack detailed
age-sex breakdowns which are useful in planning for schools, community
services, and different types of housing units. Overall, it is desirable, though not
always possible, to consider the three components of population change
separately and combine, not average, their effects. This is particularly true for
mid- and long-range projection periods because the forces driving births, deaths,
and migration may not be correlated.
Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 153; see also ARTHUR C. NELSON, ESTIMATING LAND USE AND FACILTY NEEDS
1-7 (1996) (noting thedifferences in various employment and population data and the difficulty
of determining which set to use).
78. See GREENBERG ET AL, supra note 74, at 153. Agencies that gather this information
include the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce (County Business Patterns
and Economic Census); Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (Employment
Earnings, Employment & Wages and Monthly Labor Review); and a variety of local agencies.
Id. at 189-95.
79. Id. at 8. The different groups that provide population information include state
population centers usually affiliated with a major university; offices of labor or economic
development in state departments of commerce; regional planning agencies; utility companies;
the Bureau of the Census; the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce;
Woods & Poole (a private firm that generates socio-economic projections for up to 50 years);
and regional councils of government. NELSON, supra note 77, at 2-3.
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projections-difficult. 10
An example of how the differences in quality and type of information can affect
projections has been cited by the authors of one text:
A case in point is a controversy noted by the New York Times (20 June 1976)
between the Federal Bureau of the Census and the New Jersey Department of
Labor and Industry. Federal estimates, which work from the national totals down
to the county level, showed a loss of 84,000 persons in eight counties in the
northern part of New Jersey from 1970 to 1974. The Bureau of the Census'
method was based on births, deaths, employment totals, and school enrollment
figures. New Jersey State's figures, based on a summation of minor civil division
estimates, indicated a gain of 93,000 persons in those same counties during the
same period. The state's method was based on births, deaths, utility connections
and residential building permits.8
Thus, an analysis of similar factors using federal information on the one hand and
information frommunicipal subdivisions on the other resulted in completely different
information on historical population growth. While it is impossible to determine
which source is correct, the conflict in these population determinations highlights the
types and magnitude of differences that may result in projections due to information
problems.
Further exacerbating the information limitations, and perhaps the most significant
obstruction to valid prediction of the future use of property, is the long period of time
such predictions must account for. 2 The hazardous substances found at Superfund
sites vary in the degree of ease with which they will move through soil or
groundwater. Some materials, such as volatile organic compounds, can be separated
from soil or water relatively easily, while others are hard to separate from the media
to which they are attached. These contaminants cannot be easily leached out of the
soil or diluted by percolating rainwater and thus will remain in high concentrations
at a site for a long period of time. Moreover, man-made impediments such as parking
lots or buildings, intended to decrease exposure to contaminates by insulating them
fromhuman contact, will further limit the ability of groundwater orrainwater to either
attenuate or dilute contamination over time. Parking lots or buildings, for example,
will stop rainwater from percolating through the ground and, in essence, act as a
shield for the contamination below. The result is that contamination left at such sites
will remain there at high levels for long periods of time.
As land-use planners recognize, long-range projections of land uses are unreliable
for the simple reason that the further into the future you project, the greater the
uncertainties about the factors that will influence future property use become.8 3 For
example, in the future local legislators may decide to build a cultural center or park
complex and regulators may decide to build new roads near a property or extend a
80. GREENBERG ET AL, supra note 74, at 8.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Applegate, supra note 3 1, at 282 (noting that the ability to predict or control land over
long periods of time may be extremely problematic).
83. ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 16, 102.
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commuter railway." All of these things may in turn affect the desirability of a
potential site to be used as residential property. The individuals who will make such
decisions in the future may not be elected and, in some cases, may not even be born
at the time a regulatory determination of the future use of contaminated property is
made.
Moreover, the long-term nature of the decision in the use-restriction context also
limits the accuracy of predictive population and employment models over time."
Such models cannot be used for making long-term predictions because they only
summarize past data. They do not measure or identify the underlying causal factors
that influence population growth. 6 These analyses are thus only good predictive tools
as long as such things as the demographics, wealth, and taste of the underlying
populations do not change.' For example, a recent unprecedented trend of families
and individuals moving back into cities has sparked the redevelopment of a large
number of industrial properties for residential use.8" Factors such as long-term
economic prosperity or a desire of working people to decrease their time commuting
to and from work may have, in turn, influenced this trend. Predictive models cannot
foretell these types of future changes. Thus population and economic projections over
long periods of time are of little value for purposes of predicting future property
use.89 One final aspect of the planning process further exacerbates the problem of
predicting future land use. While extrapolations from data may be potentially useful
when considering the land uses of a large geographical area-for example the land
uses of an entire city or region-determining future trends for a small geographical
area is impossible. As one well-regarded planning text explains:
[S]mall areas are more difficult [to project future land use for].... [D]ata [are]
84. Id. at 124 (noting that conditions can change quite rapidly and often).
85. EDWARD J. KAISER ET AL., URBAN LAND USE PLANING 124-268 (4th ed. 1995).
86. Id. at 128 ('The basic problem with all trend extrapolation models is that they do not
measure or identify underlying causal forces. The model only summarizes the net effect of
many forces acting on population for the past period for which the model is calibrated.").
87. NELSON, supra note 77, at 2-16; see also GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 74, at 2
(noting that population projections are built on assumptions that may or may not come true).
88. Peter Behr, Tax Cuts: Seeds of a Dilemma: If the Local Economy Slows, D.C. Could
Face Difficult Choices, WASH. POST, July 5,1999, atF25; AnthonyFlint, NewAttitude: Boston
Is Growing on a Fresh Appreciation for City Living, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1999, at Al;
John Handley, Urban Revival: Downtown Residential Rebirth Isn't Just a Chicago
Phenomenon, CHIL TRB., Nov. 1, 1998 (Real Estate), at 1; Kenneth R. Harney, Tax Law
Change Gives Boost to Home Sales: The Nation's Housing, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at K1;
John Laidler, As Suburbs Build Out, Luster Returns to Cities, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1999
(Northwest Wkly. ed.), at I; Patricia J. Mays, Atlanta Suburbanites Beginning to Move Back
into the Center of City, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1998 (Evening Update ed.), at 2, LEXIS, News
Library, CHTRIB File; Carlos Tejeda, For Many City Dwellers, Home Values Finally Head
Up, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,1999, at BI.
89. Land-use planners account for these limitations by creating a variety of projections
based on different potential changes in these underlying factors. Land-use planners then choose
the projection based on the factors they deem most likely to occur. Should such changes not
occur, planners provide a certain amount offlexibilityto change their plans. See infra notes 92-
94 and accompanying text.
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more difficult to obtain [and] the dynamics of small areas are also much more
volatile and difficult to predict. Movement in and out of the area is greater as a
percentage of the population or employment; the closing or opening of a single
large firm might change employment significantly.'
Because of these concerns, plans for small area-particularly long-range plans-are
often met with skepticism by the planning community."
Thus, any claim that one can determine the long-term future use of a specific
property, or even the land-use needs of the particular neighborhood in which that
property is located, must be discounted, if not completely disregarded, based on
limitations inherent in the land-use planning process. The decision required to be
made under the current EPA cleanup process implicates a substantial number of
planning-process limitations. Not only does it generally rely on a variety of factors
for which there is no valid information, but also it is a decision regarding long-term
future use of a very small geographical area. The idea that such future use can be
accurately predicted for purposes of a use-restricted cleanup is thus simply a myth.
While land-use planners can account for limitations in their ability to predict future
use, environmental regulators cannot. Planners account for the aforementioned
limitations by restricting the duration of their long-range plans and revisiting their
projections regularly. At most, land-use planners do not consider it possible to predict
land uses for more than twenty to thirty years into the future92 and thus limit their
long-range plans to this time period. Even the twenty- or thirty-year period, however,
is considered too long forplanning purposes and thus it is recommended that planners
gather new information on land use at five-year intervals to update their analyses.93
Indeed, recognizing the limitations in their models, planners create a number of
different "projections," all of which are plausible, based on different presumptions.
Plans are built on the most likely set of projections. However, the planning process
is itself made intentionally flexible so that when new information is received or
assumptions proved false, the plan can be adjusted accordingly. Planners also have
begun simply to create plans that endure for a period shorter than the twenty to thirty
years associated with long-range plans. "This approach helps avoid planning errors
arising from inaccurate projections. These so called 'middle-range' plans are now
90. KAISER ET AL, supra note 85, at 118.
91. GREENBERG ET AL, supra note 74, at 118. Similar observations have been made
regarding the ability to project population and employment:
Population and employment projections have been most accurate when
extended by only five, ten or fifteen years into the future. Longer-run extensions
... must be regarded as grossly speculative. Forecasting populations, especially
of small areas, beyond fifteen years ideally requires an encyclopedic knowledge
of the national, regional, and local socioeconomic, political, and physical
environments, combined with a large measure of imagination. The difficulty of
assembling this combination of attributes... [has] resulted in a dearth of long-
range projections.
Id. at 2.
92. Id. at2, 117.
93. ANDERSON, supra note 69, at 2, 13 (noting that "[a]s times change, economic
conditions change; social values and priorities change," thus requiring planners to gather new
information and update their plans regularly).
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common."
9 4
This type of flexibility is not available in the context of use-restricted cleanup. The
future-use determination will affect the level of cleanup required of a site and will
also establish the types of uses to which the site will be proscribed. In essence, the
future-use determination "locks in" the use to which property can be put. Any attempt
to revise the land use once a cleanup is completed, if possible, would require
regulators to bring a completely new response action against PRPs95 and, at the least,
would require a complete reuse of resources to revise and implement a remedy
consistent with a new land use.96 Interestingly, this is the exact problem sought to be
avoided by regulators in their initial decision to require cleanups that would allow for
any land use.97
The inability to predict future use ensures that the desired use of a substantial
number of restricted properties will actually change to a use unanticipated by
regulators. This, of course, is not to suggest that every property subjected to a use-
restricted cleanup will change its use in an unanticipated manner. There are
properties, such as the swamp land identified by Justice Breyer in his argument for
risk-based cleanup, 9 that are more likely than others not to change their use."
However, Justice Breyer's argument is based in part on the assumption that similar
certainty regarding future use can be established for all contaminated properties. "0
As this section suggests, this presumption is simply not the case. Advocates of use-
restricted cleanup must take account of the potential impacts that will result from
94. MANDELKER, supra note 68, at 78. Thus, once a future-use determination is made and
cleanup completed, EPA will not be able to change its land-use determination without
significant consequences.
95. The OSWER directive recognizes that where a cleanup is complete, regulators have
limited authority over the site and may be required to take a new response action to require
further cleanup. OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 48, at *8. The directive states:
If landowners or others decide at a future date to change the land use in such a
way that makes further cleanup necessary to ensure protectiveness, CERCLA
does not prevent them from conducting such a cleanup as long as protectiveness
of the remedy isnot compromised. (EPA may invoke CERCLA section 122(e)(6),
if necessary, to prevent actions that are inconsistent with the original remedy.) In
general, EPA would not expect to become involved actively in the conduct or
oversight of such cleanups. EPA, however, retains its authority to take further
response action where necessary to ensure protectiveness.
Id. at *9.
96. See Applegate & Dycus, supra note 13, at 10,639-40.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 314-15 (1995).
Consider, however, that many properties are built on swamp land. Indeed, Justice Breyer's
claim that the swamp property in United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir.
1990), was not going to be used for residential purposes has itself been questioned. See Finkel,
supra, at 314-15 (noting that during his confirmation Justice Breyer was questioned regarding
his claim due to the fact that the Ottati property was actually zoned residential and thus might
have been used for residential purposes).
100. Finkel, supra note 99, at 313.
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these unanticipated changes. Currently, the EPA program deals with this potential
occurrence by requiring that property use be legally restricted so that if such a change
is desired, it cannot be accomplished without the consent of the parties holding the
use restriction.' However, as this next section argues, there is no viable legal means
for restricting use as required by EPA and other use-restricted cleanup programs. 2
2. Future Use Cannot Be Proscribed
Neither CERCLA nor the RCRA contain provisions creating a program for the
restriction of land uses by EPA or state environmental agencies. 3 Regulators must
instead turn to a variety of existing legal and other devices to accomplish the goal of
controlling land use as part of a permanent cleanup. Generally, there are four main
categories of institutional controls: (1) governmental controls which rely on
regulatory authority of a state or local government to proscribe property use; (2)
enforcement tools; ° (3) proprietary controls, which rely on state property law to
proscribe use; and (4) nonenforceable informational devices.' 5 In the context of use-
restricted cleanup, these devices would be used to ensure that property use not be
changed once a cleanup to a level consistent with a particular use is completed.
a. Governmental Institutional Controls
Governmental institutional controls are those that involve a government using its
sovereign powers to impose restrictions on citizens or sites under its jurisdiction."°
Governmental institutional controls are imposed and enforced by local and state
governments by way of their police powers. Generally, governmental institutional
controls involve "restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands." 7
101. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 103-38; seealso infra text accompanying notes 193-
200 (questioning whether restricting use is the best means for dealing with unanticipated
changes in property use). Moreover, recent data suggests that a number ofareas now dominated
by industrial use will likely undergo changes to residential use over time. See infra text
accompanying notes 194-201; see also Christopher P. Harris, Land Use Ratios 1992: A Trend
Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Am. Planning Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.). Based
on his reviews ofdata from sixty-six American cities, Harris concludes that "the amount of land
used by industrial firms peaked in the late 1970s or early 1980s" and has started to decline.
Harris, supra, at 22. For example, in large cities industrial land use dropped from twelve
percent in 1983 to ten percent in 1992, while in small cities industrial use dropped from eight
percent in 1983 to seven percent in 1992. Id. at apps. 2-3.
103. In contrast, CERCLA does provide the agency with the ability to take a temporary
easement on neighboring property to allow equipment being used in the remediation of
property to pass over the property. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e), (j) (1994).
104. Although enforcement tools are generally used by a government agency, they differ
from governmental controls in that they are not regulatory. Examples of enforcement tools are
consent decrees and administrative orders. See Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,280.
105. These categories are established and defined further in Coursen, supra note 19, at
10,280-82.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926)).
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The governmental control most likely to be employed to restrict property use is
zoning.' Under zoning ordinances, the local government can delineate what
activities are allowed for a particular piece of property. For example, a zoning body
can "zone" a piece of contaminated property as "industrial" use, thus restricting its
ability to be used for other purposes such as residential.
Governmental institutional controls cannot be relied on to permanently restrict the
use of property. One characteristic common to governmental institutional controls is
that they are created legislatively at the state and local level and thus can be changed
legislatively as well.'" For example, if a governmental control takes the form of a
zoning regulation that restricts use to industrial in an area where the contaminated
property is located, such a regulation can be changed simply through a subsequent
legislative decision altering the use in that area."' The inability to ensure that zoning
bodies will not redesignate the "use" of a particular area makes zoning an ineffective
means for ensuring that property use does not change over long periods of time.
Another concern with the use of zoning to restrict land use is the fact that most
zoning regulations provide different means for varying the use of particular
properties. Typically, zoning regulations operate "down" rather than "up.""' In
districts zoned for less restrained uses, zoning ordinances generally permit, as of
right, more restrained uses, such as residential, to replace less restrained uses, such
as commercial or industrial." 2 Thus, an owner of property currently in an industrial
zone could, in most cases, legally change the use of his or her property to residential
without any need for a zoning permit.
These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that there is no means to ensure that
decisionmakers and others know the consequences of their decisions before
undertaking a rezoning. "[L]ocal planning commissions do not typically evaluate
every deed in an area before altering the zoning for that area. Thus, they might
inadvertently rezone restricted property from industrial to residential use."" 3 Authors
108. Zoning is defined as "legislative action, usuallyon the municipal level, which separates
or divides municipalities into districts for the purpose of regulating, controlling, or in some way
limiting the use of private property, and the construction and/or structural nature of buildings
erected within the zones or districts established." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (3d ed.
1991).
109. Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,280.
110. David Coursen points out that this problem may be addressed by obtaining contractual
assurances from the state or local government concerning the continued effectiveness of the
control. Id. at 10,280-81. Indeed, in many cases the continued enforcement of an institutional
control is characterized as an aspect of the operation and maintenance of the site that states
generally undertake. However, the practical value of such assurance may be limited. Id. at
10,281. In particular, there may be limitations on a state government's ability to limit the
exercise of legislative authority offuture governments. Id. Moreover, since states are generally
the parties that ensure the operation and maintenance of a site, yet generally delegate zoning
authority to municipalities, the ultimate legislative body will not be a party to the agreement.
Id.
11. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
CONTROL LAW 83 (1998).
112. Id. at 83-84.
113. Robert A. Simons & Heidi Gorouitz Robertson, Deed Restrictions and Other
Institutional Controls as Tools to Encourage Brownfield's Redevelopment, 7 ENVTiL L. &
2001]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
have noted that memories regarding the limitations on property use may be short."4
If there is no formal registry of use limitations, a change in zoning designation may
result innocently as new zoning bodies and property owners may simply not have the
knowledge necessary to ensure that a zone change or variance is not made or granted.
Based on the inability to proscribe future legislative decisionmaking and granting of
variances and the potential for restrictions on zoning to go unnoticed over time, the
use of zoning as a means to restrict permanently the use of property would be
ineffective.
b. Proprietary Controls
The type of legal restrictions most frequently mentioned as capable of restricting
land use for extended periods of time are proprietary controls."' Proprietary controls
involve property owners using their rights as owners to control the use of their
property." 6 Except for conservation easements, which are generally creatures of state
statutory law,"7 the development, implementation, and enforceability of proprietary
controls are a function of state common law. Types of proprietary controls include
easements, covenants, and equitable servitudes. In the institutional control context,
regulators will require a property owner to use one of these private tools to restrict
the use of his or her property in order to qualify for a lesser cleanup standard."'
The most common and flexible proprietary control and the legal tool most
frequently cited as the likely means for restricting property use is the easement." 9 An
easement is "a right, created by an express or implied agreement, of one owner of
land to make lawful and beneficial use of the land of another."'"2 Common-law
easements can be classified in a number of ways.' They are usually "appurtenant"
or "in gross"'" and either "affirmative" or "negative."' "u Each type of easement has
different requirements, which may vary by state, that must be met to make it
PRAc. 31, 36 (1999).
114. Id. at 34.
115. See, e.g., Coursen, supra note 19, at 10, 281; Pendergrass, supra note 22, at 10,111-12.
116. Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,281.
117. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 111, at 675.
118. See OSWER DIRECTIvE, supra note 48, at *7.
119. See, e.g., Coursen, supra note 19, at 10,281; Pendergrass, supra note 22, at 10,111.
120. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 152 (3d ed. 1991).
121. Lauri DeBrie Thanheiser, The Allure of a Lure: Proposed Federal Land Use
Restriction Easements in Remediation of Contaminated Property, 24 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REv.
271,274 (1997).
122. Easements appurtenant are those which benefit the owner in connection with his
ownership ofneighboring land. ROGERA. CUNNINGHAMETAL,THE LAWOFPROPERTY441-42
(2d ed. 1993). The land benefited is the dominant land and the land burdened is the servient
land. Id. Usually, the servient land is adjacent to the dominant land. Id. Easements in gross are
easements which benefit someone without regard for his ownership of land; the benefit to the
holder is instead, personal. Id.
123. The owner of an affirmative easement has the right to enter another's land and perform
some act on that land. Id. at 440. The owner of a negative easement can prevent the owner of
the servient land from doing an otherwise privileged act on the land. Id. Most easements are
affirmative. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 665.
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enforceable. Easements are generally thought of as good tools to restrict use not just
because of their flexibility but also because of the relative ease with which they can
be placed on land records and their ability to restrict property use almost
indefinitely.124
An easement to restrict property to industrial uses could be given to EPA, a state
environmental agency, or a third party 26 before the cleanup plan would be accepted.
The easement would limit the property's use to industrial purposes. Such an easement
would be considered a negative easement in gross. It is negative because it restricts
the owner of the easement from doing something on his orher property; namely from
using the land foranythingbut industrial purposes. 2 It is in gross because the owner
of the easement benefits personally and not as a result of his or her ownership of
adjoining or nearby property."
A use-restriction easement in this context would, however, be legally invalid and
likely unenforceable after the sale of property, and thus would not be a viable means
for restricting property use. The mainproblem arises fromthe unwillingness of courts
to find negative easements to be legally valid." 9 As a general rule "[c]ourts in the
United States seldom recognize negative easements."' 30 The failure to recognize the
legal validity of negative easements is traceable to English jurisprudence, which
recognized only a small number of negative easements due to the fact that such
easements are difficult to spot' and thus might be enforced against owners who
bought property subject to an easement without knowledge that it is encumbered.'13 2
English courts thus recognized only four very specific types of negative easements:
124. The rule against perpetuities states that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." JOHNE.
CRIBBET, PINcIPES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 79-82 (2d ed. 1975). This rule is used to
prevent the tying up of land and removing it from commerce by creating an interest that
prevents the alienation of land. The rule does not apply to present interest, so it does not apply
to easements. Id.
125. One must take into account the willingness of EPA, as the holder, to enforce an
easement or other proprietary interest due to the fact that federal attorneys tend not to litigate
in state courts and that there may be no federal claim on which to base pendant jurisdictional
claims.
126. An example of a third party that might be given an easement would be a long-standing
public-interest environmental group or land trust in the state. Such groups, due to their location
near the contaminated site and general vigilance may be best situated to ensure that the
property is not reused for other purposes. However, such a group must have a long and stable
history of working in the affected area and must also have the ability to enforce an easement
or other use restriction in court.
127. CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 122, at 440.
128. Id. at 441.
129. JUERGENSMEYER&ROBERTS,supranote 11 l,at656; 7THOMPSONONREALPROPERTY
§ 60.02(e)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., Michie Co. 1994) [hereinafter THOMPSON].
130. 7 THOMPSON, supra note 129, § 60.02(e)(1), at 395.
131. On the other hand, affirmative easements, the most common of which is the right to
pass over someone's property, will generally be evidenced by a road or some other marks over
property and, therefore, will be more easily discovered by future owners before purchase of the
property.
132. See id.
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air, water, light, and not to remove support from the easement holder's building. 3 3
Although the English courts' concerns regarding the purchase of property without
knowledge of the easement are less valid in the United States, 34 state courts have
accepted the English limitations and "with some exceptions... will not recognize
purported negative easements beyond the traditional four."' 35 In the vast majority of
states use-restriction easements would thus not be a legally valid means for ensuring
that property use would be restricted.
A second concern exists regarding the ability of a use-restriction easement to
survive equitable challenges or to continue where property ownership is transferred.
Easements are vulnerable to a number of equitable defenses such as laches and
estoppel, 36 and may also be extinguished through transfer of the property,
particularly through foreclosure. 37 Easements may not survive foreclosure by a party
holding a security interest in the property prior to the creation of the easement. Thus,
even if a negative easement were legally valid, it could still be avoided by equity or
through foreclosure. Thus, in the context of use-restricted cleanups, easements
through which a property owner promised to refrain from using the property in
certain ways would not be viable tools for restricting the use of property. 38
Another common type of nonpossessory interest is the restrictive covenant.
Restrictive covenants are similar to easements but are usually subject to a different
set of formal requirements. 39 A restrictive covenant is a clause in a deed that limits
the landowner's use of property. 4 Restrictive covenants are governed by state
133. Id.
134. Unlike the different states of the United States that maintain land recording statutes
universally, England did not require that all easements be recorded in land records; thus it
could not be ensured that notice would be received by future purchasers. See id. As a result,
the negative easement would too easily arise by prescription. See id.
135. Id. § 60.02(e)(1), at 396.
136. Id. § 60.08(b)(4)-(5).
137. Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The Potential for Future Use Analysis in Superfund
Remediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 1503, 1526 (1995).
138. Many states have attempted to address the failures of easements and other land-use-
restrictive devices to restrict land use over long periods of time through the creation ofstatutory
"conservation easements." See 7 THOMPSON, supra note 129, at § 60.02(e)(4). Although such
easements may solve a number of the problems set forth in this section of the Article, they also
contain their own limitations for use in this context. Significantly, the type of use anticipated
by use-restricted cleanup is not a permitted use of most conservation easements. Most
conservation easement statutes allow easements to conserve open space, to preserve recreation,
historic, cultural, and other natural values. See id. Easements serve primarily environmental
purposes. They are not intended to be used to allow property to be maintained in a more
contaminated state.
139. For an analysis of the relationship between negative easements and covenants, see
CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 122, at 440.
140. A restrictive covenant is defined as
a promise included in an agreement restricting the use of'real property or the kind
of building that may be erected thereupon; the promise is usually expressed bythe
creation of an express covenant, reservation, or exception in a deed. In order for
a grantor to enforce the covenant against remote grantees, the covenant must "run
with the land."
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property law and vary from state to state.' 4' Usually, to create a successful restrictive
covenant that "runs with the land" and is thus binding on all future owners, 42 four
requirements must be met: (1) the covenant must be enforceable between the
covenanting parties and satisfy the Statute of Frauds; (2) the covenantingparties must
intend to bind their successors; (3) there must be "privity of estate"; 43 and (4) the
covenant must also "'touch and concern' the land."'" All four elements must be met
to create a valid restrictive covenant, 14' both the third and fourth requirements pose
problems in the context of use-restricted cleanup.
First, it will be difficult to satisfy the requirement that a use-restriction covenant
touch and concern the land because the benefit of the covenant is held in gross. If the
benefit or burden does not touch or concern the land, the covenant will not be
enforceable against future purchasers." Just what amounts to "touching and
concerning" the land has been the subject of significant debate and has led to the
identification ofa half-dozen different tests by a leading authority on real property.47
The vast majority of states, however, take the position that the benefit of a real
covenant must not be in gross to touch and concern the land.'48 This is particularly
the case where the promisee, such as the government, owns no land that could be
BARRON'S LAw DICTIONARY 419 (3d ed. 1991) (emphasis in original).
141. JUERGENSMEYER& ROBERTS, supra note 111, at 657.
142. Id. at 660.
143. There are two forms ofprivity: vertical and horizontal. Id. at 662. Privity is the mutual
or successive relationship to the same rights of property. Vertical privity concerns the
relationship between a party to the covenant, the promisor, and her successor. See
CUNNINGHAM ET Al., supra note 122, at 475-77.
Horizontal privity concerns the relationship between the original parties.
While a few cases reject the need for horizontal privity of estate between the
contracting parties, most require it for the burden to run. There are three
definitions of horizontal privity used in running burden cases. The English courts
follow the most restrictive view, requiring a tenurial relationship. Less restrictive
is the so-called Massachusetts view that requires a mutual and simultaneous
interest in the land by both the promisor and promisee.
JUERGENSMEYER& ROBERTS, supra note 111, at 662-63.
144. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 cmt. a (1936) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
(emphasis in original). A covenant touches and concerns the land when it enhances the
enjoyment of a parcel of real property by burdening the enjoyment of another. See id. § 537
cmts. a, c.
145. See CUNNINGHAMETAL, supra note 122, at 469; JUERGENSMEYER& ROBERTS, supra
note 111, at 660.
146. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 111, at 660; Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of
Institutional Controls in Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENvTL L.J. 1, 19
(1995).
147. See 7 THOMPSON, supra note 129, § 62.08 (listing and describing six different judicial
tests for touch and concern).
148. JUERGENSMEYER&ROBERTS, supra note 111, at 662; Borinsky, supra note 146, at 17.
A minority view is that restrictive covenants in gross are binding on subsequent owners. See
Gillen-Crow Pharmacies v. Mandzak, 220 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio Com. P1. 1964); Borinsky, supra
note 146, at 19.
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benefitted.49 Thus, in a large majority of states, when the owner of property places
a restrictive covenant into the deed to comply with environmental requirements, the
burden falls on the land of the property owner but the benefit does not touch and
concern the land and the covenant will not be enforceable against future owners of
the property.
A number of other concerns will affect the validity of restrictive covenants in
certain circumstances. The vertical privity element, for example, binds a successor
to a restrictive covenant only when there has been succession to the same "estate or
interest" or "an estate or interest corresponding in duration."'" As a result, transfer
of property to a lesser estate holder may result in the failure of a covenant.15' For
example, a transfer of a life estate from a promisor who had a fee simple absolute
would not transfer the burden of a real covenant at law." Many states also maintain
statutes of limitation that terminate covenants and other servitudes after a period of
years. ' The limitations are based on a general belief that covenants become obsolete
after the passage of time." Restrictive covenants in the use-restricted cleanup
context, however, may have to extend forhundreds of years. Thus, as with easements,
covenants will be subject to a number of limitations that limit their validity, making
them unable to proscribe the use of property as required.
A third type of nonpossessory interest in land is the equitable servitude.' 5
Equitable servitudes are closely related to restrictive covenants and arise when courts
of equity enforce agreements that do not meet all the requirements of a covenant. The
elements of an equitable servitude are different from those of a restrictive covenant:
(1) there must be a clear statement of intent to bind future owners; (2) actual notice
must be given to subsequent landowners; and (3) the agreement must touch and
concern the land."
Many of the problems that arise with real covenants are also applicable to equitable
servitudes. In particular, the traditional invalidity of interests held in gross has
survived with equitable servitudes to an even greater extent than with restrictive
covenants."5 Because the benefit of a use-restriction servitude would be held in
gross, the servitude would not survive the transfer of the property. Moreover, many
equitable defenses, such as laches, unclean hands, estoppel and waiver, or
149. See, e.g., Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d. 756 (Mass. 1995); JUERGENSMEYER&
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 662.
150. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 535.
151. City of Perrysburg v. Koenig, No. WD-95-01I, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5334 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1995); RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 535 cmt. c (requiring that there be
a succession to the same interest or estate).
152. 7 THOMPSON, supra note 129, § 62.05.
153. Seeid. §62.17.
154. See id.
155. Equitable servitudes are defined as building restrictions and restrictions relating to the
use of land that are enforceable in equity by and between landlords. BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 162 (3d ed. 1991).
156. Russell R. Reno, Covenants, Rents and Public Rights, in 2 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY §§ 9.24-.30 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
157. See Borinsky, supra note 146, at 19.
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acquiescence may be applied when a party attempts to enforce the servitude.'58 As a
result, any statement or action by the holder of the servitude to suggest that it has
waived its right of enforcement or any delay in enforcement might void the servitude.
Thus, it is extremely unlikely that an equitable servitude will be adequate as a means
to ensure that property use is properly restricted.
c. Enforcement Tools
Enforcement tools alone cannot limit the use of property. Consent decrees and
administrative orders, like contracts, are only binding on the parties to the decree or
order. Thus, any use restriction contained within them will be enforceable only
against the parties named in and signing the order. As a result, parties can avoid the
use restrictions contained within enforcement tools simply by transferring the
property to a party who is not subject to such an order."59 The fact that a simple sale
of property can avoid the proscription on use necessary to limit risk exposure
pathways ensures that enforcement tools alone will not be able to proscribe future
land use as required by the new cleanup program.
The inability to proscribe property use, in conjunction with the inability to predict
future use, carries significant consequences for current use-restricted cleanup
programs. The failure of both of these elements suggests that existing use-restricted
cleanup programs cannot ensure that property use will not change in a way that will
result in exposure routes greater than those anticipated by the cleanup. Existing
programs thus fail to ensure that a cleanup will be protective of human health and the
environment and also fail to ensure the permanency of cleanup.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT PROGRAM
AND SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Inability to Predict Use and the Creation of Future Costs
The inability to predict and proscribe future property use raises serious policy
concerns for the implementation of a use-restricted cleanup program. This section
analyzes those implications and identifies programs that respond to them. Itnotes first
that failure to predict future property use will result in the creation of costs that may
be borne by future generations and argues that such costs should be internalized into
the initial remedy-selection process. This section then considers potential means for
internalizing these costs, ultimately arguing that either a private remedy requiring the
responsible parties to post a bond for future cleanup or a publicly administered use-
restriction cleanup fund could accomplish this task. In the process of examining the
158. 7 THOMPSON, supra note 129, § 62.16 (citations omitted).
159. The new owner will notbe subject to anew order, either. It will be buying propertythat
has been permanently cleaned in accordance with EPA regulations and with EPA's approval.
Even if it were arguable that using the property in a way that violates a use restriction could be
considered a release subjecting the new owner to CERCLA liability, this would be treated as
a new release subject to new enforcement or otherwise would violate the requirement that the
initial cleanup be permanent. See Ayers, supra note 137, at 1526.
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way in which costs should be addressed, this section argues that cleanup rather than
restricting use should be the goal for properties whose use has not been properly
anticipated.
Failure to predict properly the future use of property in all circumstances creates
future costs that regulators may consider in fashioning a use-restricted cleanup
program. Where it could be proven to a high degree of certainty that property would
be used for no other purpose, use-restricted cleanup would result in little or no future
harm. In such cases the property would continue to be used for its highest and best
use and there would be no basis by which exposure routes would be increased; thus,
health would continue to be protected. However, as shown above, it is impossible to
predict future property use. 6° Thus, it is necessary to consider the problems created
by the fact that property may change to an unanticipated use in the future.
If future use of property cannot be predicted accurately, the desired use of property
may change in an unanticipated manner. In the case of use-restricted property, a
desire to change the use would have one of three potential results, each with its own
related costs. On the one hand, the property's use maybe allowed to change. Such a
change may either result in increased risks to the potential residents due to the lower
levels of cleanup that had originally been undertaken or, to avoid such harm, will
require further cleanup to a level appropriate for the new use; the costs of cleanup
being passed on from the responsible parties' to innocent developers or landowners
in some cases.'62 In both situations the use of restrictions will result in harm being
done to parties in the future, either through increased health risks or the cost of
cleaning. 1
63
On the other hand, the property use might be restricted so that it continues to be
used in the same manner as it was previously. This option is the choice emphasized
by existing cleanup programs."6 In such a case environmental regulations serve to
limit property to a use that is not its most valued. This, of course, also creates costs:
160. See supra Part III.B.1.
161. By the time such further cleanup would be required, many PRPs may no longer be in
business. Moreover, settlement with EPA and satisfactory remediation of the property will
generally release parties from responsibility for the release. The OSWER directive specifically
recognizes these limits, noting that should land use change and further cleanup be necessary,
EPA would generally not expect to become involved in the oversight of the cleanup, but would
"retain its authority to take further response action where necessary to ensure protectiveness."
OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 48, at *11.
162. The OSWER directive recognizes this, stating that "landowners or others [may] decide
at a future date to change the land use in such a way that makes further cleanup necessary."
OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 48, at * 10.
163. It is arguable that if property has not been abandoned, the parties would be able to
internalize the costs of cleanup into the costs of sale. In such a case, a party seeking to use the
building for residential purposes would require amuch greater discount than another industrial
user because of the costs of cleanup associated with a change to residential use. The fact that
the property is more valuable to the seller if it continues in its industrial use (although,
assuming the cleanup to residential levels, it would be more valuable for residential purposes)
creates a large disincentive to ever change the use. In other words, one of the great
disincentives of a scheme that proscriptively limits property's use is that it will keep the
property from being sold for restricted uses even if those uses are more valuable.
164. See, e.g., OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 48, at *6-7.
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for restricting the use in such a case ensures that property will not be used for its
highest and best purposes and may also impact the taxes recoverable from the
property. Moreover, failure to allow a property use to change from a use such as
"industrial" to a use such as "residential" may decrease the likelihood that other
residential properties would be developed in the neighborhood as well as stigmatize
existing nearby property. 6" Thus, no matter how use-restricted cleanup is
accomplished, the inability to predict future use of property will ensure that some
properties will change, orbe sought to change, to a use that was unanticipated at the
time of cleanup. No matter how this change is responded to, it will create substantial
costs that maybe borne by individuals who were not responsible for the pollution.
B. Should Use-Restricted Cleanup Address Future Costs?
That the future costs created by failure to predict accurately the use ofproperty may
fall on individuals who were not responsible for the creation of the contamination is
neither efficient nor equitable. In terms of efficiency, the failure to internalize all
costs into the price of the polluting activity creates, in essence, a subsidy to the
polluter. This, of course, will result in the creation of an excessive amount of
pollution. Further, traditional equitable concerns suggest that, for the properties that
will change in an unanticipated manner, the polluter and not an innocent party should
pay the full cost of his or her activity. As one author has noted, "[r]esponsibilities.
.. have a moral component, which allows them to attach to particular individuals.""'
Failure to hold the specific parties who caused the contamination responsible for its
complete remediation would violate this traditional notion offainiess. Together these
concerns provide substantial support for the addition of a component requiring
responsible parties to pay for the potential future harm.
However, before proceeding to an analysis of the means to achieve internalization
of future costs, it is necessary to consider a separate set of factors that have been
raised in criticism of use-restricted cleanup programs. These criticisms arise from the
fact that the costs associated with the failure to predict future property use will be
placed on future generations in derogation of our responsibilities to them. 67
The idea that we owe obligations to future generations has a variety of
justifications:
One may view responsibilities toward future generations as analogous to an
individual's prudent planning for later life, as an extended expression of love for
our children, as the most appropriate manner of repaying our debt to past
generations, as an outgrowth of our desire to see the accomplishments of
humankind perpetuated, as the necessary teleological culmination of the race, as
an inescapable consequence of one generation overlapping the next, and as a
planetary trust, analogous to a charitable trust."'
165. See infra text accompanying notes 193-200.
166. Jeffrey Spear, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsibilities to Future
Generations, 2 N.Y.U. EWvTL L.J. 117, 129 (1993).
167. Id. at 122.
168. Id. at 122-23 (footnotes omitted).
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Advocates of intergenerational equity argue that future generations have a
fundamental interest entitling them to receive, among other things, clean air, water,
and land from preceding generations.'69 The extent to which current generations can
use resources to the detriment of future generations is subject to significant debate.
However, one standard commonly referred to suggests that, at the least, current
generations must preserve natural resources so as to "prevent a worsening of the
planet's environmental quality"'70 and to allow equal access to the "legacy of past
generations" and "to not unduly restrict the options available to future generations."'.7'
Pursuant to this standard, advocates of intergenerational equity would argue a large-
scale program of cleanup that leaves a substantial amount of contamination in the
ground or creates other substantial costs unduly benefits current generations at the
expense of future ones.
It may of course be argued that the benefits of use-restricted cleanup far outweigh
the costs and, thus, failure to predict future use accurately does not unduly burden
future individuals. This is particularly the case when considering the fact that the
benefits 73 are received immediately while the costs will be incurred 74 at a time in the
future, requiring that such costs be discounted to current values in order to compare
costs and benefits properly.75 According to such cost-benefit techniques, the costs
169. Id. at 129-30.
170. RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoucY 307-08
(1997).
171. Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global
Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW
CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 385,401-05 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1991); see also REVESz,
supra note 170, at 307-08.
172. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation:
AreJustice, Efficiency and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 706 (1998) (arguing
that there are more "costs" associated with contamination than those measured by cost
discounters). The argument concerning "substantial costs" has been made regarding use-
restricted cleanup in situations where property use is properly predicted. However, as this
Article notes, in situations where property use will not change, such a program is relatively
costless. See supra Part IV.A.
173. Benefits will primarily be the savings realized on the cost of cleanup.
174. The costs incurred would be based on the inability to use the property for its highest
use (such as lost tax revenues, decreases in value of surrounding properties, and potentially
decreased development) or for cleaning the property to allow for its use.
175. The rationale for discounting can be based on either the time value of money or
consumer impatience. Liza Heinzerling, Discounting OurFuture, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV.
39,41 (1999).
[T]he time value of money means that money received later is worth less than the
same amount of money received earlier, while one waits for the later money to
arrive, one could have been investing the earlier money in some other venture. In
addition, one may simply prefer to receive money sooner rather than later because
one is anxious to consume the goods money can buy. For both of these reasons
(money is productive over time, and people are impatient), in order to compare
two investments that pay benefits over different periods of time, one needs not
only a common currency (here it is dollars), but one also needs to state that
currency in common temporal terms. This leads to the idea of computing present
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associated with the future-use change would likely be minimal. Indeed, it has been
shown that costs of unfathomable size, when discounted over long periods of time, 76
are negligible in today's dollars.'
Critics, however, have recently begun to contest the validity of time discounting in
the intergenerational context.' They note that the time discounting approach contains
a bias in favor of future generations.'" Further, such critics note that the traditional
justifications for discounting that may be valid in the case of intragenerational
decisionmaking break down in the intergenerational context.' Thus, it is highly
questionable whether discounting is the correct standard on which to rest an analysis
of the potential harm to future generations. Due to the failure to establish more than
a rhetorical measure of intergenerational equity, it will be difficult to resolve the
conflict between parties regarding thepotential effect future costs wouldhave on use-
restricted cleanup measures. At the least, however, regulators should take notice of
and attempt to understand more fully the extent and scope of the costs that a use-
restricted cleanup program would leave to future generations. Potentially serious
intergenerational equity concerns aside, the previously mentioned considerations of
value through discounting.
Id.
176. The choice of a discount rate will, of course, play a significant role in the discounting
process. The present value of$1 million received in ten years is $900,000 using a one percent
discount rate but only $390,000 using a ten percent discount rate. Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
177. A few examples will demonstrate the effect of discounting over long terms. Michael
Gerrard, for example, notes that "if human life is considered to be worth $8 million, and a ten
percent discount rate is chosen, then the present value of saving a life one hundred years from
now is only $581." Gerrard, supra note 172, at 742-43. On a broader scale, Derek Parfit notes,
"At a discount rate of five percent, one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths
in 500 years." DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONs 357 (1984). Finally, Geoffrey Heal
observes that "[i]f one discounts present world GNP over two hundred years at 5% per annum,
it is worth only a few hundred thousand dollars, the price of a good apartment. Discounted at
10%, it is equivalent to a used car." Geoffrey M. Heal, Interpreting Sustainability, in
SuSrNArujT DYNAmIcs AND UN CERTAiNTY 3-7 (Graciela Chichilnisky et al. eds., 1998).
178. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 998 (1999) (arguing that the only
discount rate that would fully account for the utility of future generations is a rate of zero
percent and that any positive rate simply reflects a depreciation of the utilities of future
generations).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 987-1014. In one specific example, Revesz notes:
Intragenerational discounting affects the timing with which a particular
individual decides to expend a fixed amount of resources. It is merely a reflection
of the individual's preferences and ... does not raise any significant ethical
questions. In contrast, intergenerational discounting affects the quantity of
resources available to each individual.
In an intergenerational context, one must initially decide how to allocate
resources to individuals in different generations-a societal decision with ethical
underpinnings. Then, each individual must decide how to time the consumption
of resources across her lifetime-a personal decision with no ethical
ramifications, other than a weak concern about excessive myopia.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
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economic efficiency and equity suggest that regulators should address future costs in
the design of use-restricted cleanup programs.
C. Methods for Internalizing Future Costs
Having discussed the fact that any use-restricted cleanup program that cannot
correctly identify all future uses of property will create future costs that may be
borne by innocent parties and the policy rationale for requiring regulators to
internalize these costs into the original remedy, it is now necessary to consider the
different means available for accomplishing this task. A number of environmental
programs that require responsible parties to establish financial responsibility for
potential cleanup of property in the future may serve as a model.' These
programs generally require parties to determine the costs associated with the
future cleanup' and provide the financial means to pay for the cleanup should it
be required. The RCRA, for example, requires parties who own or operate
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities ("TSDs") to
demonstrate financial responsibility for, among other things, cleanup of hazardous
waste that may be released from the TSD in the future." The regulations enacting
this requirement provide specific guidelines for determining the costs associated
with the closure and postclosure activities of hazardous waste sites"u and set forth
in detail the requirements and specific language that any assurance of financial
responsibility for these costs must contain.' Similarly, the Oil Pollution Act of
199086 requires vessel owners to establish their financial responsibility for
potential oil spill liability.8 7 The variety of financial devices that can be used to
ensure payment of potential future costs include: insurance, guarantee, surety
bond, letter of credit, or qualification as self-insurer."' This general model could
easily be adapted to a use-restricted cleanup regime. Regulators could require
PRPs to establish the costs that will result from a change in use and to provide
181. E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6924
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring financial responsibility for potential future releases from
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities); id. § 6991b (requiring financial
responsibility for potential leaks from underground storage tanks); Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
33 U.S.C. § 2716 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring financial responsibility for potential oil
tanker spills).
182. But see Technical Standards and Corrective Actions Requirements for Owners and
Operators of Underground Storage Tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (2000) (setting the amount of
financial responsibility at $1 million for owners and operators of petroleum underground
storage tanks located at petroleum marketing facilities, or that average more than 10,000
gallons of petroleum per month and $500,000 for all other owners and operators).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6) (1994).
184. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.142 (cost estimate for closure); id. § 264.144 (cost estimate for
postclosure care).
185. See id. § 264.143 (financial assurance for closure); id. § 264.145 (financial assurance
for postclosure care); id. § 264.151 (setting forth the specific language for financial assurance
agreements).
186. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
187. Id. § 2761.
188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t).
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adequate financial assurance for the costs should the unanticipated change occur.
A few differences between use-restricted cleanups and the existing programs
would require some changes to existing programs. In particular, under the existing
programs owners and operators are required to create financial assurance for a
cleanup that they would undertake themselves while, in the case of use-restricted
cleanup, the response would likely be undertaken by a third party or just one
member of an originally large group of PRPs. Regulators must therefore ensure
that third parties have access to the moneys 9 posted by the PRPs and must also
ensure that cleaning parties do not attempt to "overclean" the property because
they are using someone else's money to do so. This could easily be accomplished
by making EPA the beneficiary of any financial assurance and requiring EPA to
disburse the money only for activities taken in compliance with existing cleanup
standards, such as those set forth in the NCP.
One final concern raised by these arrangements deals with the possibility that
the money may not be needed for a very long period of time. As a result, many of
the devices currently acceptable to ensure payment for future cleanups in other
programs may not be durable enough to ensure cleanup in the use-restricted
context. For example, the bonds currently posted by owners of TSD facilities are
only required to endure for thirty years."9 Use-restricted cleanup, because of its
duration, may require a cleanup more than thirty years into the future. In such a
case, regulators must be certain that the financial arrangements made with PRPs
can endure for such a time period.
While it is important to consider private options, such as those listed above, one
other program could ensure that financial arrangements last for the required period
of time. Such a program would create a government fund that would be used to
collect the money from PRPs and to pay it out to later applicants in case of an
unanticipated change in use. Such an idea is behind the creation of such programs
as the Superfund and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund (often
referred to by its acronym "Lustf'). 9 ' These funds, particularly Superfund, are
currently politically disfavored." However, there is a significant difference
between these and a potential use-restricted property cleanup fund. While the
Superfund and Lust trusts are funded with moneys collected by taxes, the use-
restricted fund ("URT") would be funded with money from PRPs. Moreover, the'
money used to fund the URT would be much less than the cost of cleaning a
property to residential or agricultural levels immediately and thus would represent
a significant savings to PRPs. These differences might make the proposal more
politically palatable.
Finally, the question arises as to what future costs regulators should allow PRPs
to consider in posting financial assurance. As previously discussed, regulators may
189. This is not to suggest that a current owner could not access the money if he or she
desired to change the use in the future.
190. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.117 (post-closure care and use of property).
191. Seegenerally42U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(l 1); I.R.C. § 9508 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 365 (West 1999); 40 C.F.R. § 280.101 (state fund or other state
assurance); 40 C.F.R. § 280.107 (local government fund).
192. See Report Criticizes Superfund Program, L.A. TIMEs, June 12, 1999, at A7; see also
Revesz & Stewart, supra note 15, at 3-4, 13-14.
2001]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
respond to unanticipated changes in property use by either restricting or allowing
the change.' Each response will create its own particular set of costs, which may
include increased health risks to potential residents should the use change without
further cleanup; costs of cleaning property to allow for the new use; or, the variety
of costs that may result from restricting property to something other than its
highest and best use.' 9' The most efficient scheme would allow PRPs to estimate
the costs associated with each response and to provide financial assurance to
satisfy the least-costly alternative. There are, however, a number of arguments that
favor requiring the property to be cleaned to allow the unanticipated use as the
primary, if not sole, alternative.
Even if regulators did have the legal tools available to restrict the use of
property, 95 the costs associated with this option are extremely difficult to identify
and evaluate, and such a scheme would be difficult to administer. While the costs
of cleaning property are well known,"9 the costs associated with restricting use
may be diffuse and difficult to quantify. For example, the use restriction may
affect other property values and even limit development. Consider the situation of
a use-restricted property in a previously industrial area that has become residential.
The fact that the property has been cleaned to only industrial levels may stigmatize
other properties proximate to the blighted property.9 In some cases the decrease
in value will make the development of other residential properties in the
neighborhood cost prohibitive. This will happen in cases where the stigma
changes the amount a developer could charge for each individual unit to a point
where the costs of development exceed the revenues that could be received from
sale of the property.' s Failure to redevelop will keep property value from being
realized and, in turn, result in other costs such as the loss of taxes for the
community and more blight to the neighborhood. Determining the size and extent
of such costs for each property would be difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish. Moreover, administration of such a response would be-costly. Such a
response would generate a large number of parties harmed by the regulatory
decision. Each party's claim would have to be reviewed and a final determination
193. See supra Part III.A.
194. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
195. As previously argued, even if regulators did choose the option of restricting future use,
it is highly unlikely that existing legal tools would enable them to accomplish this goal. See
generally supra Part I11B.2. Thus, a federal land-use restriction would be necessarybefore this
option could be pursued further.
196. The average cost of cleanup ofaCERCLA site is $30 million. Revesz& Stewart, supra
note 15, at 14.
197. "The phenomenon known as stigma occurs when potential purchasers devalue the cost
of property associated with environmental contamination due to their fear of contamination."
Alex Geisinger, Nothing But Fear Itself A Social-Psychological Model of Stigma Harm and
Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REv. 452, 453 (1997). "Even when a particular piece of
property has not been, and could never be, adversely impacted by nearby contamination, its
value frequently will decrease in the eyes of potential purchasers as a result of their fear." Id.
198. This will be most likely to occur when the factors that create stigma are greatest. Id. at
475-83. In some cases, the reported stigma affect has decreased property value by as much as
ninety-five percent. Id. at 486 & n. 163.
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of the amount made before it could be paid. Thus, if regulators should continue to
focus on the existing alternative of restricting use, they will need to undertake a
difficult and resource-consuming analysis of a variety of potential new costs as
well as needing new legal tools, such as a legislatively created land-use restriction,
to achieve their goal.'
Requiring PRPs to provide costs for the cleanup of their site, should it change in
an unanticipated manner, will not require the creation of new legal tools nor result
in the same amount of administrative cost. Administrative costs in this scheme
would be minimized because only one party (the cleaning party) will be seeking to
recover costs. Moreover, the future costs associated with this potential response
will be the easiest to determine accurately. Existing technology and information
would allow responsible parties to estimate the likely extent of contamination over
various periods of time and to determine the costs of cleanup of that contamination
using currently available or future technology" that is likely to exist. Indeed,
much of the information informing the site analysis, such as the speed and
direction of groundwater flow, existing contaminants, and contours of any
aquifers, will have already been gathered by the responsible parties in their initial
site analysis. Finally, in cases where property changes in an unanticipated manner,
cleanup is the only permanent solution. Should, for example, a property use be
restricted, potential costs such as future taxes will be incurred by every generation
that lives in the blighted community. Similarly, increased health risks associated
with not cleaning property will accrue to every person who comes into contact
with the property until the contamination is completely diluted. For these reasons,
should the costs of determining that option which is least costly require allowing
for only one response to a change, regulators should require property that changes
in an unanticipated manner to be cleaned.
In summation, EPA's land-use-restricted cleanup process fails to deliver on its
promise of providing equal health protection to the existing cleanup scheme
without further costs. There are however, a number of existing models that
provide for internalizing potential future costs that could be adapted to a use-
restricted cleanup program. To the extent that such a model is adapted to use-
restricted cleanup, regulators should consider changing the existing scheme to
199. This section of the Article does not consider in detail the option of letting the property
be used for the new use without cleanup. Such a response would violate CERCLA's
requirement that remedial schemes be protective of human health. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621
(1994). It should, however, be noted that allowing the changed use without further cleanup
raises a number of similar concerns to the use-restricted scheme. The administrative costs
associated with paying for the increased health risks would be extremely high. Indeed,
regulators would not just have to consider claims from individuals exposed to the excessive
risks but would also likely have to consider claims for property devaluation and other related
costs brought by neighbors of the incompletely cleaned site. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Contamination, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (allowing neighbors' property devaluation claims
because cleanup left residual risk of one in 100,000 instead of the generally accepted one in
one million).
200. It may be arguable that future technology will come into existence that will drastically
reduce the price of cleaning the contaminants at a site. See Revesz, supra note 178, at 990
n.246.
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require future cleanup when property use changes in an unanticipated manner.
Requiring cleanup, besides being perhaps the intuitively correct response, will also
be much easier to administer and the most inexpensive choice in the long run.
V. CONCLUSION
The enormous pressure to find more cost-effective responses to contamination
has led to the adoption of a new use-restricted cleanup regime without considering
the regime's consequences in detail. While a majority of the cost savings from
such a remedy may still be realized through a responsible regime, failure to
consider the legal insufficiencies of the existing scheme and the potential for
future harm will result in significant harm to human health and the environment.
